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INTRODUCTION
Imagine an insured driver carrying an automobile liability policy with bodily
injury limits of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence. This insured driver
is deemed to be at fault in an accident that injures one passenger within her own
vehicle and two persons in a separate vehicle. The two passengers in the other
vehicle both file claims against the insured, settling with the liability insurer for the
maximum of $25,000 each, which exhausts the policy limits of $50,000 per
occurrence. Subsequent to these settlements, the injured passenger in the driver's
vehicle files a claim with the insurer for injuries that she also sustained as a result of
the accident. This scenario seems to suggest the insurer has filfilled its duties under
the terms of the policy and is neither obligated to settle with nor defend the insured
against the subsequent claimant because the policy limits were exhausted.
However, Kentucky law places certain duties on the insurer that may suggest
otherwise. These duties include an obligation to attempt in good faith both to
protect an insured from a potential excess judgment and to promptly settle with all
claimants where liability is reasonably clear.2 Due to the apparent conflict of these
duties, coupled with the lack of guidance by Kentucky courts, insurers, insureds,
and potential claimants are in the dark with regard to their rights and obligations in
such situations.
Although Kentucky courts have not yet explained the various rights and
obligations of the parties in the previous scenario, a number of other states have.3
These states have employed a number of different approaches that consider various
factors in determining whether the insurer has fulfilled its good faith duties.' These
various approaches provide an adequate foundation for Kentucky courts to develop
a straightforward framework that clarifies each party's rights and obligations.
Although there are a number of writings that discuss an insurer's best practices
in this situation, there has been relatively little written about the need for clarity
and guidance from the courts.s Furthermore, liability insurance has wide-reaching
implications in all of our lives. This is evidenced by the types of liability insurance
available, including automobile, corporate directors and officers, professional
malpractice, and even coverage for sexual abuse by an employee. Due to this lack of
1 See Ky. Ass'n of Ctys. All Lines Fund Tr. v. McClendon, 157 S.W.3d 626, 635 (Ky. 2005).
2 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-230(6) (West 2008); Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v.
Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Ky. 1975).
3 Safeco Ins. Co. v. Ritz, No. Civ.A. 03-240, 2006 WL 119991, at *6-8 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2006).
4 See id. at *7-8; see also Douglas R. Richmond, Too Many Claimants or Insureds and Too Little
Money Insurers' Good Faith Dilemmas, 44 TORT TRIAL &INS. PRAC. L.J. 871, 880-92 (2009).
s See generally Eric A. Hamilton, Too Many Hands in the Pot: The Morass of Multiple Claims
with Limited Insurane, COMMON DEFENSE, Spring/Summer 2015, at 6; Duan. J. Grage & Suzanne
L. Jones, Settling with Limited Funds, AM. B. ASS'N: SEC. OF LITIG.: INS. COVERAGE (Aug. 1, 2012),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/insurance/articles/mayjune20l2-competing-
files.html [https://perma.cc/4SL2-37TQ; Jonathan M. Stern, What's an Insurer to Do? Multiple
Claims and Insuficient Limits, FOR THE DEFENSE, Sept. 2009, at 18.
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clarity and the prevalence of liability insurance, the need for a clear and definitive
framework from Kentucky courts is of the utmost importance. As such, this Note
will provide an analysis that promotes prompt and fair settlements, while also
protecting insureds from excess judgments. Specifically, this Note will address
whether, and under what circumstances, an insurer can settle in good faith with
certain claimants to the exclusion of others. Furthermore, this Note will address
whether, and under what circumstances, an insurer is obligated to defend its
insured after exhausting the policy limits when other claims remain or subsequently
arise. Ultimately, this Note will advocate for a solution to these problems by
incorporating and adapting other states' approaches into a straightforward analysis
that promotes prompt and fair settlements.
Part I examines the various duties and obligations an insurer owes to both its
insured and potential claimants under Kentucky law. Specifically, Part I examines
an insurer's duty to act in good faith to protect an insured from an excess judgment,
the insurer's duty to attempt in good faith to promptly settle with potential
claimants where liability is reasonably clear, and an insurer's duty to defend after
policy limits have been exhausted. Most importantly, Part I discusses how these
duties conflict in the situation of multiple claims and limited fuids.
Part II examines the various jurisdictional approaches on whether, and how, an
insurer may settle with certain claimants to the exclusion of others when the claims
exceed the policy limits. Part II also discusses the factors jurisdictions employ in
determining if an insurer has fulfilled its good faith obligations when settling with
certain claimants to the exclusion of others. Part II also discusses the various
approaches to whether an insurer's duty to defend terminates upon exhaustion of
the policy limits.
Part III advocates for Kentucky courts to provide a straightforward resolution
with regard to this problem by drawing on other jurisdictions' approaches. In
seeking such a resolution, Part II proposes a relatively easy to apply step-by-step
analysis that promotes the protection of an insured from an excess judgment,
provides potential claimants with prompt and fair settlements, and informs insurers
of what actions constitute good faith in such situations.
I. AN INSURER'S CONFLICTING DUTIES UNDER KENTUCKY LAW
A covered occurrence involving potential multiple claims that will exceed the
policy's limits creates inescapable problems, such as exposing an insured to an
excess judgment, denying a claimant a prompt and fair settlement, and exposing an
insurer to potential claims of bad faith. Kentucky courts and legislators have long
attempted to reconcile these problems within liability insurance. 6 However,
Kentucky case law addressing these attempts has been limited to situations
involving a single claimant, and not the situation of multiple claims and limited
6 See § 304.12-230(6); Gruwdy 531 S.W.2d at 497.
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finds.' Furthermore, these attempts have inadvertently created a conflict among an
insurer's duties in the context of multiple claims and limited funds. To fully
understand the potential for such conflict, an examination of an insurer's duty to its
insured and claimants in single claimant situations is necessary.
A. The Duties an Insurer Owes to its Insured
In addition to a liability insurer's well-known duty to indemnify, the insurer
also owes a duty to act in good faith to protect its insured from a judgment in
excess of the policy limits.' As a part of this duty, an insurer must also attempt to
obtain a release of the claims against its insured.' In order to protect the insured
from an excess judgment, the insurer must make a good faith attempt to settle the
claims against the insured.o If the insurer fails to act in good faith to settle the
claims, the insurer is liable for any excess judgment."
In Manchester Insurance & Indemnity Company v. Grundy, the issue was
whether the insurer had acted in bad faith for failing to settle in a single claimant
situation. 12 The court explained an insurer's liability in excess of the policy limits as:
There is no liability on the insurer for failure to settle claims
against the insured in excess of the policy limit in the absence of
bad faith. It is the duty of the insurer to exercise the utmost good
faith. Mere errors of judgment are not sufficient to constitute bad
faith. Acting in bad faith or the failure to exercise good faith is
sufficient to create liability on the part of the insurer for the excess
of the policy limit.'
The Grundy court restated the test for bad faith in failing to protect the insured
from an excess judgment in a single claimant case as, "Did the insurer's failure to
settle expose the insured to an unreasonable risk of having a judgment rendered
against him in excess of the policy limits?"' 4 If so, the insurer is guilty of bad faith.'s
The court employed several factors to determine if the insurer acted in bad faith.'"
Those factors included the probability of recovery, whether the recovery would be
in excess of the policy limits, whether the claimant offered to settle for less than the
7 See Ritz, 2006 WL 119991, at *6.
' Grundy, 531 S.W.2d at 498.
1 Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glass, 996 S.W.2d 437, 453 (Ky. 1997).
1 See id.
n Am. Physicians Assurance Corp. v. Schmidt, 187 S.W.3d 313, 318 (Ky. 2006).
12 Grundy, 531 S.W.2d at 494-95.
o Id. at 497 (quoting Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. J. F. Schneider & Son, 307 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Ky.
1957)).
14 Id. at 501.
1s Id
16 Id. at 499-500.
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policy limits, and whether the insured made a demand for settlement from the
insurer.17
In addition to this duty, an insurer also has a duty to defend the insured when
there is an allegation that might fall within the coverage terms of the policy.'" This
duty terminates once the insurer establishes that the allegation is not covered by the
policy.' 9 Considering that many liability policies state the duty to defend ends when
the policy's limits are exhausted,20 one would reason that once an insurer exhausts
the policy limits there exists no remaining allegations that might fall within the
coverage terms of the policy. As such, an insurer's duty to defend would
terminate. 21
Although the majority of jurisdictions employ this reasoning, 2 several
Kentucky cases have suggested that the insurer may still be required to defend the
insured after exhausting the policy's limits regardless of the policy's language.2 In
Schmidt, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated, in dicta, that an insurer may be
required to pursue an appeal on behalf of its insured after paying out the policy's
limits, but did not elaborate under what circumstance an insurer would be required
to do so. 24 The Kentucky Court of Appeals has also made this distinction in a
single claimant case where the policy's duty to defend provision was construed as
ambiguous. The court stated that to leave an insured without a defense simply
because the insurer had paid out the policy's limits would be "an extremely harsh
construction" and would "leave the insured without adequate or any protection." 25
Ultimately, whether the duty to defend continues after exhausting the policy's
limits remains an open question under Kentucky law.
B. The Duties an Insurer Owes to Claimants
In an attempt to ensure that potential claimants received payments for injuries
caused by a covered occurrence, Kentucky passed the Kentucky Unfair Claims,
Settlement Practices Act ("KUCSPA").' Like many other states' versions, the
KUCSPA requires insurers to attempt "in good faith to ... effectuate prompt, fair
and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably
17 Id.
18 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W.3d 830, 841 (Ky. 2005); Ky. Ass'n of Cntys.
All Lines Fund Tr. v. McClendon, 157 S.W.3d 626, 635 (Ky. 2005).
11 McClendon, 157 S.W.3d at 635.
2 ROBERT P. REDEMANN & MICHAEL F. SMITH, 1 LAw AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE
COVERAGE LITIGATION § 4-24 (July 2016).
2 1 d
22 Id.
' See e.g., Am. Physicians Assurances Corp. v. Schmidt, 187 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Ky. 2006);
Ursprung v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 497 S.W.2d 726, 729-31 (Ky. 1973).
24 Schmidt, 187 S.W.3d at 319.
25 Ursprung, 497 S.W.2d at 729.
2
6 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-230 (2008).
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dear."27 In State Faum Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Reeder, the
Kentucky Supreme Court stated that the KUCSPA's purpose was to "protect the
public from unfair trade practices and fraud" and that the statute should "be
liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose."' Furthermore, under KRS §
446.070, a third party claimant has a direct cause of action against an insured for
violating the KUCSPA. Ultimately, the purposes of the KUCSPA, KRS §
446.070, and the court's interpretation of them, seek to prevent an insurer from
taking advantage of a claimant's weaker bargaining position by imposing a direct
duty from the insurer to potential daimants.5
However, the Kentucky Supreme Court has also limited the reach of KUCSPA
by stating that the KUCSPA "only requires that an insurer make a good faith
attempt to settle any claim, for which liability is beyond dispute, for a reasonable
amount."" In addition to this limitation, the Kentucky Supreme Court has also
stated that an insurer has not acted in in bad faith for failing to settle a claim unless
"the insurer either knew there was no reasonable basis for denying the claim or
acted in reckless disregard for whether such a basis existed."32
The Kentucky Supreme Court has explained the test for determining whether
an insurer has acted in bad faith for failing to settle when the action is brought by
the claimant is the same as the test in Grundy, where the action was brought by the
insured." Specifically, the question is whether the insurer's failure to settle exposed
the insured to an unreasonable risk of having a judgment rendered against them in
excess of the policy limits.34 Also, the factors used to determine this question are
very similar to the factors in Grundy. Those factors are: "(1) whether the plaintiff
offered to settle for the policy limits or less, (2) whether the insured made a
demand for settlement on the insurer, and (3) the probability of recovery and of a
jury verdict which would exceed the policy limits."35 Since the test is practically the
same in both situations, it is clear that an insurer's duties to both its insured and
claimants are significantly intertwined.
C. The Conflict Between an Insurer's Duties
When There are Multiple Claims and Limited Funds
Kentucky courts have addressed situations where an insurer's failure to settle
with a single claimant exposes the insured to liability in excess of the policy's limits.
27 Id.
x State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky. 1988).
2 KY. REv, STAT. ANN. § 446.070 (1942); Reeder, 763 S.W.2d at 117-18.
3 Reeder, 763 S.W2d at 118.
31 Coomer v. Phelps, 172 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Ky. 2005).
32 Bentley v. Bentley, 172 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Ky. 2005).
" Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glass, 996 S.W.2d 437, 451 (Ky. 1997).
Id. (quoting Manchester Ins. &Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493, 501 (Ky. 1975)).
3 Id. (citing Manchester Ins. &Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Ky. 1975)).
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However, Kentucky courts have yet to provide an analysis in the case where the
insurer is presented with multiple claimants and limited funds. 6 Considering how
the above-described duties are intertwined, there becomes an apparent conflict
between the duties owed by the insurer to act in good faith to settle all claims
where liability is reasonably clear and its duty to protect an insured from an excess
judgment when there are multiple claims that exceed the policy limits. To exhaust
the policy limits in settling with certain claimants where liability is reasonably clear,
while not settling with other claimants where liability is also clear, deprives the
non-settling claimants of their fair share under the KUCSPA. " As such, an
unsettled claimant may proceed against the insured for damages sustained, and may
possibly proceed against the insurer for failing to settle in good faith. Furthermore,
under this scenario the insurer may also be subject to a claim of bad faith by the
insured for subjecting the insured to an excess judgment owed to the unsettled
claimants.
Additionally, the question remains: at what point does an insurer's duty to
defend end when the insurer has paid out the policy limits, while other claimants
who have yet to settle proceed against the insured? If the insurer's duty ends when
the policy limits are exhausted, it seems that the insurer would not be obligated to
defend the insured against the unsettled claims. However, as stated above,
Kentucky courts have not explicitly ruled on this." Ultimately, in order for insurers,
insureds, and potential claimants to understand their rights and obligations in such
a situation, it is imperative that Kentucky courts provide guidance on this issue that
is consistent with the purposes of these underlying duties.
II. EXAMINATION OF MULTIPLE CLAIMANT AND LIMITED FUNDS SITUATIONS
Fortunately, many other states have attempted to answer the questions with
regard to an insurer's conflicting duties in multiple claims and limited funds
situations. Their answers serve as a useful guide for Kentucky courts. However,
relative to other areas of the law, the various approaches courts apply to the issue of
multiple claims and limited funds vary greatly. In order to build an adequate
framework for developing an analysis for Kentucky, a detailed examination of these
approaches is necessary.
6 See Safeco Ins. Co. v. Ritz, No. Civ.A. 03-240, 2006 WL 119991, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 12,
2006).
31 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-230(6) (2008).
38See Rit 2006 WL 119991, at *6.
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A. Various Approaches to Multiple Claimants Situations
Although a number of commentators have attempted to categorize these
approaches, the categorizations lack uniformity." However, Douglas Richmond
has provided one of the most comprehensive and logical categorizations in his
article Too Many Claimants or Insureds and Too Little Money: Insurer's Good
Faith Dilemmas.0 Richmond organizes the various approaches into three broad
categories: (1) the first to judgment rule; (2) the pro rata rule; and (3) the first to
settle rule.4 Richmond is quick to note that the first to judgment rule has been
widely discarded due to the rise of bad faith litigation and the increasing length of
time between filings and judgments.42 Additionally, a fourth approach that may fit
within each of the three previously mentioned approaches or stand independent is
the filing of an interpleader action by the insurer.43
Courts applying the pro rata rule distribute the policy's proceeds on a pro rata
basis in proportion to the damages suffered by each claimant." The amount any
individual claimant may receive is capped by the per person limits within the
policy.4s Although an insurer may choose to settle on a pro rata basis before
litigation, assuming that each claimant cooperates in the settlement, such a practice
is typically not required by law." As such, and in the absence of a settlement, the
pro rata rule requires litigating each of the claims to determine the proportion by
which the limited proceeds will be distributed.' This forces each claimant to wait
until the litigation of each claim is resolved before they may recover any of the
insurance proceeds.48 As such, the delay in payment that the pro rata rule may
impose seems opposed to the KUCSPA's effort to ensure prompt settlement. 49
Underwriters for Lloyds of London v. Jones, a 1953 Kentucky case, suggests
that Kentucky is a pro rata state.so In Jones, Jerry Smith was a driver who was
involved in an accident where one person died and three were injured.s' Smith had
an automobile policy with a per accident and per person limit of 35,000." Claims
were brought on behalf of the three injured parties and the estate of the deceased.s3
39 Compare Richmond, supra note 4, at 880, with Grage & Jones, supra note 5, and Stern, supra
note 5, at 18.
' Richmond, supra note 4, at 872.
41 Id. at 880.
42 Id.
43 See Grage &Jones, supra note 5.
4 Richmond, supra note 4 at 880-81.
45 Id.
4 See id at 881.
47 See id.
I See id. at 880-81.
49 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-230(6) (2008).
")Underwriters for Lloyds of London v. Jones, 261 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Ky. 1953).
Id. at 686.
52 Id.
53Id
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Jones, one of the injured parties, recovered a judgment for $20,000 against Smith.54
The trial court construed the policy as limiting the liability for each claimant, and
not as a limit of the liability for individual accidents.ss As such, the court applied
the $5,000 of insurance proceeds toward the judgment.s6 However, the Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the dear language of the policy limited the liability
to $5,000 for one accident.s" As such, the Court of Appeals directed that the
$5,000 proceeds should be distributed on a pro rata basis to each of the four
claimants once each claimant had received a final judgment on their claim. "
Based on the facts and holding of Jones, Kentucky is arguably a pro rata state. 59
However, the subsequent rise in bad faith insurance law has made Jones irrelevant.
The rise of duties such as the insurer's good faith duty to protect its insured from
an excess judgment and the good faith duty on an insurer to attempt to effectuate a
prompt and fair settlement with claimants where liability has become reasonably
dear were not as widely recognized under Kentucky law in 1953 as they are today.'
As such, Kentucky should make a dear departure from the pro rata approach
expressed in Jones.
Under the first to settle rule, an insurer has the ability to settle for the policy
limits with certain claimants to the exclusion of others.6 Generally, this approach
grants insurers increased discretion in determining when, and with whom, the
insurer settles.62 However, the application of this rule varies across jurisdictions
with two major distinctions.
Under the first variation, the insurer is given broad discretion on how it
distributes, and ultimately exhausts the proceeds. 61 In Scott v. Gallacher, the
Appeals Court of Massachusetts termed this discretion as within the business
judgment of the insurer." The insurer had settled with claimants on a first to settle
basis. 65 The court explained: "Nothing in the statutory scheme requires an insurer
to effectuate a global settlement simultaneously with all potential claimants."' The
court noted the importance of the fact that the insurer had reached out to Rivera, a
potential claimant who initially declined to file a claim.6 ' After learning that Rivera
was not interested in filing a claim, the insurer settled with the other cooperative
5 Id.
5 5 d.
5 Id.
5 Id. at 687-88.
5 Id. at 688.
11 See Grage &Jones, supra note 5.
6 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-230(6) (2008); Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy,
531 S.W.2d 493,497 (Ky. 1975).
61 Richmond, supra note 4, at 881-82.
62 Seeid at 881.
6 See Stern, supra note 5, at 19.
6' Scott v. Gallacher, No. 10-P-209, 2011 WL 93084, *2 (Mass. App. Ct., Jan. 11, 2011).
6 Id. at *1-2.
6 Id. at *2.
67 Id. at *1, 3.
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claimants. 68 The court stated the insurer was "entitled to make a good faith
business judgment to settle the claims in the order that they were presented" after
the insurer "reasonably concluded that Rivera was not interested in pursuing a
claim."69
The alternative approach to the first to settle rule applies a heightened standard
on the insurer's decision to settle with certain claimants to the exclusion of others
by requiring the insurer to select the claimants it will settle with in a manner that
will maximize the benefit to the insured."o Florida law, for example, allows for an
insurer to settle with certain claimants to the exclusion of others but requires an
insurer to fulfill three obligations in determining whom it may choose to exclude in
settlement." The first obligation requires the insurer to fully investigate all claims
in order to best limit the insured's exposure.7 2 The second requires the insurer to
attempt "to settle as many claims as possible within the policy limits."" The third
requires the insurer to choose certain claimants to settle with in a manner that
minimizes the insured's risk of an excess judgment." This third requirement
distinguishes this variation from the insurer's business judgment seen in Scott."
Instead of allowing the insurer to simply choose to settle with claimants under a
broad first to settle approach, the insured must rationalize its choice of who to
settle with.
The fourth approach of filing an interpleader action is generally available to an
insurer regardless of which of the three traditional approaches that a specific
jurisdiction follows. 76 Interpleader allows the insurer to place the insurance
proceeds with the court, while the various claimants litigate their rights to the
funds. 7 Various jurisdictions have suggested the use of filing an interpleader action
when there exists multiple claims and limited funds. 8 These courts stress the
benefit of filing an interpleader action is that it greatly reduces the chances of an
insurer's actions being construed as bad faith." Some courts have even suggested
that an insurer's failure to file an interpleader action is evidence of bad faith.' The
use of interpleader also discharges an insurer's duty to indemnify." Another benefit
68 Id.
69 Id. at *2.
7 Stern, supra note 5, at 19.71 
d
n Id. (quoting Farinas v. Fla. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co., 850 So.2d 555, 560-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003)).
Id. (quoting Farnas, 850 So.2d at 560).
Id. (quoting Farinas, 850 So.2d at 560).
7' Scott v. Gallacher, No. 10-P-209, 2011 WL 93084, *2 (Mass. App. Ct., Jan. 11, 2011).
76 See Grage &Jones, supra note 5.
n Richmond, supra note 4 at 877.
7 E.g., Club Exch. Corp. v. Searing, 567 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Kan. 1977); McReynolds v. Am.
Commerce Ins. Co., 235 P.3d 278, 284 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
' See Grage &Jones, supra note 5.
a See McNally v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 254, 262-63 (3d Cir. 1987).
" Richmond, supra note 4, at 877.
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to the use of interpleader is that it provides compensation to each worthy
claimant.u
On its face, the use of interpleader seems like a simple solution to a complex
problem; however, there are a number of issues that interpleader does not address.
One is it is unclear whether an insurer's use of interpleader will discharge the
insurer's duty to defend because the claimants may still proceed against the insured
despite the insurer exhausting the policy limits in the interpleader action." As such,
an insurer cannot be certain whether it has discharged all of its obligations to its
insured, thus leaving the door open to claims of bad faith by the insured or
daimants.
Another problem with interpleader is that it does not automatically release the
insured from the full amount of liability resulting from the judgment of an
interpleader action." Unlike the insurer's duty to indemnify, which includes the
duty to seek a release of liability for the insured, an insured may still be subject to
liability that is not completely covered by the insured's policy upon the judgment of
an interpleader action.' This means, although an insurer has filed an interpleader
action, the insured may still be subject to the full amounts of any judgment
rendered against the insured, regardless of the policy limits. Although an insurer
that files an interpleader action which results in an excess judgment cannot
reasonably be held to have acted in bad faith, the result of an excess judgment
against the insured is not a desirable outcome.
Ultimately, Kentucky courts have not made it clear which approach is
applicable in Kentucky. However, as mentioned in the discussion of Jones,
Kentucky may arguably be a pro rata state." If an insurer strictly followed the pro
rata rule in Jones, though, the insurer's actions are contrary to the purposes of the
duties it owes to both the claimant and insured. The pro rata rule implicates an
insurer's duty to act in good faith in effectuating a prompt settlement by requiring
the lengthy process of litigating each claim." This means that certain claimants
who are willing to negotiate a global settlement must wait for the conclusion of
litigation before receiving their fair share, depriving them of a prompt settlement.
The pro rata rule's requirement of litigating each individual claim to determine the
damages each claimant is entitled to clearly conflicts with the KUCSPA promotion
of prompt settlements. ' Furthermore, requiring litigation to determine each
claimant's share provides an unnecessary burden on the court when there exists
2 See Grage &Jones, supra note 5.
a Richmond, supra note 4, at 878.
* Id.
5 See id.
8 See id.
" See Underwriters for Lloyds of London v. Jones, 261 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Ky. 1953).
8 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 304.12-230(6) (2008); see Jones, 261 S.W.2d at 688; Richmond, supra
note 4 at 880-81.
99 See § 304.12-230(6).
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more efficient approaches to handle these situations, such as the first to settle
approach.
On the other hand, an insurer may disregard Jones and proceed with
settlements on a first to settle basis in an effort to provide prompt settlements
under the KUCSPA. Yet, if an insurer follows this approach, the insurer risks
incurring bad faith liability arising from its failure to settle with certain claimants
where liability is also reasonably clear and for subjecting the insured to an excess
judgment arising from the non-settling claimants. Although some commentators
have considered Kentucky a pro rata state because ofJones," it is important to note
that Jones was decided well before the good faith duties of protecting the insured
from an excess judgment and to effectuate prompt and fair settlements to claims
where liability is reasonably dear were firmly established Kentucky law."
B. Bad Faith Analysis in Multiple Claims and Limited Funds Situations
Each of these approaches is subject to a fair share of problems, which are
addressed through each jurisdiction's bad faith analysis. However, Kentucky law
lacks a bad faith analysis for the situation of settling with certain claimants to the
exclusion of others. 92 Before addressing the ideal solution for Kentucky, an
examination of other jurisdictions' bad faith reasoning is necessary.
The issue of bad faith by an insurer for settling for the policy's limits with
certain claimants to the exclusion of others was at issue in Safeco Insurance
Company v. Ritz, a 2006 federal case in the Eastern District of Kentucky.93 In
Ritz, similar to the hypothetical at the beginning of this note, the insured had an
automobile liability policy with bodily injury limits of $25,000 per person and
$50,000 per occurrence.94 The insured was involved in an accident that caused
bodily injury to one of his passengers and two other persons in another vehicle.1s
The insurer, without notice that the passenger intended to file a claim and after
informing the insured that the policy's limits were not very high, settled with the
two injured claimants from the other vehicle, exhausting the policy limits. 9
Subsequent to these settlements, the passenger filed a claim, prompting the insurer
to seek a declaration that it had acted in good faith in settling the claims with the
90 See Grage & Jones, supra note 5; ROBERT D. MONFORT, KENTUCKY MOTOR VEHICLE
INSURANCE LAW § 7:4 (2015-2016 ed.); see also Jones, 261 S.W.2d at 688.
91 § 304.12-230(6) (established in 2008, while Jones was decided in 1953); Manchester Ins. &
Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Ky. 1975) (decided in 1975, while Jones was decided in
1953).
2 See Safeco Ins. Co. v. Ritz, No. CivA. 03-240, 2006 WL 119991, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2006)
("Neither the parties nor the Court have been able to locate any Kentucky case involving a bad faith
claim where the insurer settles with certain claimants to the exclusion of other claimants.").
93 Id.
94 Id. at *1.
9 5 Id.
% Id.
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injured persons in the other vehicle and that it no longer had a duty to indemnify
or defend the insured against the subsequent claimant.'
The court began its analysis by examining the duty to defend provision in the
policy, which read: "Our duty to settle or defend ends when our limit of liability for
this coverage has been exhausted."" The court reasoned that under Kentucky law,
an insurer's duty to defend ends when an insurer establishes that the liability
claimed is not covered by the policy. 9 To support this rule, the court cited
Kentucky Association of Counties All Lines Fund Trust v McClendon. In
McClendon, the issue was whether the insurer had a duty to defend fiscal court
magistrates who had illegally increased their salaries against a suit brought by the
People for Ethical Government, Inc."oo The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the
duty to defend did not extend to this suit because the nature of the actions of the
magistrates was not covered by the policy. However, as explained earlier, Kentucky
law is not clear on whether the duty to defend terminates at the same time as the
duty to indemnify where the policy states that both the duty to defend and
indemnify terminates when an insurer has exhausted the policy limits.'o' As such,
the use of the rule in McClendon in this situation is debatable. Regardless, the Ritz
court held that the insurer's duty to defend had terminated as long as the
settlements were valid and entered in good faith.102
The court prefaced its analysis of whether the settlements were valid and
entered in good faith by stating that neither the parties nor the court were able to
locate a Kentucky case addressing the issue.0 3 Although the court did not render
judgment on this issue due to the lack of discovery with regard to it, the court
provided what it reasoned would be the proper analysis under Kentucky law. 10
Ultimately, the court structured its analysis similar to a bad faith failure to settle
action with one claimant."os The court specifically mentioned the three factors
involved with that analysis, and adapted those factors to represent a situation
involving multiple claimants. Those factors were:
[W]hether the settlement offers of all the claimants totaled the
policy limits or less, (2) whether the insured demanded that the
insurer settle with all claimants, and (3) the probability that the
claimants excluded from the settlement would obtain a jury
" Id. at *2.
" Id. at *5.
9 Id.
'02 Ky. Ass'n of Ctys. All Lines Fund Tr. v. McClendon, 157 S.W.3d 626, 628-29, 635 (Ky. 2005).
.o. See Am. Physicians Assurance Corp. v. Schmidt, 187 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Ky. 2006); Ursprung v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 497 S.W.2d 726, 729-31 (Ky. 1973).
102 Ritz 2006 WL 119991, at *5.
n Id. at *6 ("Neither the parties nor the Court have been able to locate any Kentucky case involving
a bad faith claim where the insurer settles with certain claimants to the exclusion of other claimants.").
In Id. at *6-8.
105 Id.
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verdict or verdicts against the insured which would exceed the
policy limits.1
06
However, believing that this analysis was inadequate, the court examined other
states' reasoning regarding the settlement with certain claimants to the exclusion of
others.'0o
The Ritz court looked to the Kansas case of Levier v. Koppenheffer, where the
court was faced with multiple claims and limited funds."' In Levier, the insured,
Koppenheffer, was at fault in an automobile accident that injured Cartwright and
Levier." The insurer, Aetna, promptly investigated the accident and concluded
that the aggregate claims by the two injured parties would exceed Koppenheffer's
policy limit of $100,000. "0 Within the next month, Aetna sent a letter to
Koppenheffer informing him that Cartwright and Levier's claims would exceed his
policy limits."' The letter also advised Koppenheffer that he might wish to retain
his own attorney." 2 Several months after the accident, Aetna prepared a detailed
report that valued Levier's claim at $2,120,000.00 and Cartwright's at
$49,965.67. "' The report recommended offering each claimant a $25,000
settlement and placing the remaining funds with the court in an interpleader
action."' Aetna proposed this settlement to each of the claimants, settling with
Cartwright for the $25,000 and receiving a counteroffer from Levier for
$100,000. "s However, Aetna did not respond to Levier and failed to inform
Koppenheffer of Levier's counteroffer." 6 Instead, Aetna proceeded to place the
remaining policy limits with the court in an interpleader action." 7 Subsequently,
Levier obtained a judgment of $600,000 against Koppenheffer."s Koppenheffer
assigned his right to a bad faith cause of action against Aetna to Levier for a fill
release of liability.'19
To determine if Aetna had acted in bad faith, the court considered eight
factors:
(1) [T]he strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of
liability and damages; (2) attempts by the insurer to induce the
106 Id. at *7.
108 Id.
" Levier v. Koppenheffer, 879 P.2d 40, 42-43 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).110 d
nI Id. at 43.
1 Id.
113Id.
114 Id
116 Id
u1 Id.
's Id.
"' Id.
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insured to contribute to a settlement; (3) failure of the insurer to
properly investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the
evidence against the insured; (4) the insurer's rejection of advice
of its own attorney or agent, (5) failure of the insurer to inform
the insured of a compromise offer, (6) the amount of financial
risk to which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to
settle; (7) the fault of the insured in inducing the insurer's
rejection of the compromise offer by misleading it as to the facts;
and (8) any other factors tending to establish or negate bad faith
on part of the insurer.1 20
In analyzing the factors, the court found Levier had a strong case against
Koppenheffer for both liability and the amount of damages."1 First, Aetna made
no effort to induce Koppenheffer to contribute to the settlement.12 Second, Aetna
had not informed Koppenheffer of Levier's compromise offer." Third, and noted
as the most significant factor in this case, was that Aetna was not exposed to any
greater financial risk if the Levier refused to settle because Aetna was going to
exhaust the full amount of the policy limits regardless of Levier's decision.1 4
Koppenheffer, instead, faced the risk of being liable for over $2 million as opposed
to only being liable for the difference between Levier's $100,000 counteroffer and
the $25,000 that Aetna had settled with Cartwright for.125 After analyzing the
factors, the Court of Appeals of Kansas found that Aetna had breached its duty of
good faith to Koppenheffer.12'
The Ritz court also looked to 77G Insurance Co. v. Smart School, a federal
case applying Florida law." In that case, Smart School had a liability policy from
TIG insurance that covered "sexual abuse occurrence" with a $1 million per
occurrence limit. " Under the terms of the policy, a single "sexual abuse
occurrence" included multiple acts of abuse if done by one individual. On August
18, 2003, "D.N.," a parent of a "A.N." who was a student at Smart School, filed
suit alleging that Curtis Gordon, a Smart School teacher, began inappropriately
touching A.N. in July of 2002, which culminated in her rape on August 30,
2002. " The suit alleged that Smart School failed to properly respond to
complaints that Gordon was inappropriately touching A.N."3o TIG defended Smart
1 Id. at 46-47 (quoting Bollnger v. Nuss, 449 P.2d 502, 512 (1969)).
121 Id. at 47.
2 Id
123 Id
124Id
125 Id
126 Id
"7 Safeco Ins. Co. v. Ritz, No. CivA. 03-240, 2006 WL 119991 *8 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2006).
m TIG Ins. Co. v. Smart School, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1338-40 (S.D. Fa. 2005).
12 9 Id. at 1338.
13 Id
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School, and on June 4, 2004, the court approved a confidential settlement.'
Subsequently, on September 20, 2004, "P.J.," a parent of "J.J." who was also a
student at Smart School, filed suit against Smart School for failing to respond to
complaints that Gordon was sexually abusing J.J. from November 2001 until May
2002.132 On April 2, 2004, Jose Silva, who represented both A.N and PJ, sent a
demand letter to defense counsel inquiring about the available limits with regard to
both A.N. and PJ.'s claims.133 TIG contended that it first learned of P.J.'s claim in
May 2004, the same month that it reached a settlement agreement for A.N.13
The issue before the court was whether TIG had violated its duty of good faith
in protecting Smart School from an excess judgment when it settled with A.N. for
an amount that, although confidential, the court admitted exhausted most of the
policy's limits.'3 ' In analyzing the issue, the court laid out four obligations of the
insurer to demonstrate good faith when settling with certain claimants to the
exclusion of others. These obligations required the insurer to:
(1) fully investigate all claims arising from a multiple claim
accident; (2) seek to settle as many claims as possible within the
policy limit-, (3) minimize the magnitude of possible excess
judgments against the insured by reasoned claim settlement; and
(4) keep the insured informed of the claim resolution process. 3 1
In granting summary judgment in favor of TIG, the court noted that Smart
School had only provided two facts that suggested bad faith by TIG. '3 The first
was that TIG knew of P.J.'s claim before the settlement proposal was submitted to
the court. 13 The second was that TIG did not inform Smart School when it settled
the A.N. lawsuit that TIG's position was that the $1 million single occurrence limit
was applicable to both claims.' 3 ' The court concluded that even if these allegations
were true, no reasonable juror could find from only these two facts that TIG had
breached its duty of good faith."4
The third case the Ritz court relied on was Carter v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company.4 ' In Carter, Michelle Keefe was at fault in an
automobile accident on April 25, 1997, that injured three people, including
i3 11Id.
m 'Id.
m Id.134 Id
13s Id. at 1337.
1 Id. at 1350 (quoting Gen. Sec. Nat'1 Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 303 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1325 (M.D. Fla.
2004)).
m Id. at 1350-51.
3
1 Id. at 1351.
139 Id.
140 Id.
"' Safeco Ins. Co. v. Ritz, No. Civ.A. 03-240, 2006 WL 119991, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2006).
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Thomas Carter, and killed a fourth.142 Keefe had a policy with State Farm that had
limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence. 4 3 On May 15, 1997,
State Farm sent a letter to Carter's attorney suggesting the potential claimants
should meet for a settlement conference. 1" Carter's attorney replied that a
settlement conference was premature because Carter and another of the injured
claimants were still receiving medical treatment and were not sure of the extent of
their injuries.145
On June 9, 1997, State Farm informed Carter's attorney that it had received a
demand from the deceased claimant's estate for $50,000 and that State Farm must
decide that day whether to accept or not.'" State Farm accepted the settlement
with the deceased's estate, leaving only $50,000 of the policy limits available for the
other claimants. 147 Carter then demanded the remaining $50,000 to settle his
claim. State Farm encouraged Carter to engage in global settlement negotiations
with the other claimants.1" Carter, however, refused and State Farm proceeded to
settle with two other claimants paying out $45,000, and tendering an unconditional
check to Carter for $4,000.1'4 Carter subsequently filed a suit against State Farm
for breaching its duty of good faith and fair dealing."s
In affirming the trial court's summary judgment for State Farm, the court of
appeals pointed to two facts that supported a finding of good faith. First, the court
noted State Farm had requested Carter's participation at a global settlement
conference, which Carter denied. "' Second, State Farm kept other claimants
informed with regard to the deceased claimant's demand and subsequent settlement
for $50,000.152
A common thread is seen in each of the cases that Ritz relied upon. Ultimately,
each case turned on, to a varying extent, whether the insurer investigated,
communicated the situation to each party, and whether the claimants cooperated.
As such, and discussed in greater detail in Part III, an analysis that promotes
prompt settlements and protects an insured from an excess judgment must
incorporate these elements.
142 Carter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 369, 370-71 (Tex. App. 2000).
r4 Id. at 371.
144Id
145 Jd
146Id
147 Id
'a Id.
1s1 Id. at 372.
152 Id. at 371.
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C. Approaches to the Duty to Defend Upon Exhaustion ofPoIcy Limits
After wading through the various bad faith approaches, the issue of whether the
insurer's duty to defend continues after exhaustion of the policy limits remains.
Kentucky courts have expressed, in dicta, that the duty to defend may continue
after exhaustion of the policy limits regardless of the policy's language,' despite
the majority rule from other jurisdictions that gives deference to the policy's
language. Under the majority rule, courts enforce policy language that states that
the duty to defend terminates when the policy limits are exhausted.15 4 When the
policy does not speak to this question, the duty to defend extends to claims that
remain or arise after the exhaustion of the policy's limits.15
The wide-ranging approaches to whether and how an insurer may settle in
good faith with certain claimants to the exclusion of others and whether the duty to
defend extends past this point demonstrate that no jurisdiction has yet to find an
ideal solution. Each approach has both its advantages and disadvantages, but taken
as a whole, these approaches lay an adequate foundation for Kentucky to develop a
unique solution that furthers prompt settlements that protect an insured from an
excess judgment.
III. A UNIQUE SOLUTION FOR KENTUCKY
Due to the lack of Kentucky case law on this issue and the prevalence of liability
insurance, Kentucky insurers, insureds, and claimants need guidance. Such
guidance should address this problem in a way that is consistent with the
KUCSPA's promotion of prompt settlements. 5 6 Furthermore, the solution must
also promote the protection of insureds from excess judgments, while providing
insurers with sufficient guidance so as to conduct their settlement procedures
without worry of a subsequent claim of bad faith.
First and foremost, Kentucky courts should make clear the type of approach
that is to be applied in multiple claimants and limited funds situations. Kentucky is
arguably a pro rata state based on Jones."' However, this opinion is outdated and
largely irrelevant in light of the rise of bad faith claims for failing to effectuate
prompt and fair settlements to claims where liability is reasonably clear. The
lengthy process of litigating each potential claim before distributing any of the
insurance funds is contrary to the KUCSPA's language seeking prompt
settlements.'s A pro rata approach is also opposed to the duty an insurer owes to
its insured in protecting the insured from an excess judgment, because the insured
" SeeAm. Physicians Assurances Corp. v. Schmidt, 187 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Ky. 2006).
Lm4 See REDEMANN & SMITH, supra note 20.
155 Jd.
156 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-230(6) (2008).
S" Underwriters for Lloyds of London v. Jones, 261 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Ky. 1953).
15' See § 304.12-230(6).
604 VOL. 105
2016-2017 Multiple Claims, Limited Funds, and Conflicting Duties 605
is not necessarily released from the excess liability that may result from the court's
judgment. As such, the pro rata approach serves no current identifiable purpose
under Kentucky insurance law.
Instead, Kentucky courts should align themselves with the number of other
states that allow insurers to settle claims on a first to settle basis subject to a good
faith standard. Allowing insurers this authority will further the purpose of the
KUCSPA to effectuate prompt settlements where liability is reasonably dear,
instead of applying a pro rata or interpleader approach that is subject to the lengthy
process of litigating each individual claim. Furthermore, an established first to
settle rule would also facilitate claimants to pursue claims on a timely basis for fear
of losing out on the insurance proceeds. This increased pressure on claimants
would also result in an increased likelihood of a global settlement among all
claimants, which would release the insured thus protecting against an excess
judgment.
After establishing Kentucky as a first to settle state, the bad faith analysis
should be structured with the goal of facilitating prompt and fair settlements that
protect the insured from an excess judgment. This is best done by an analysis that
grants greater discretion to an insurer when settling claims where the possibility of
multiple claims may exceed the policy limits. It is important to note, however, that
this increased discretion should only be available to the insurer when there exists a
reasonable likelihood that there will be multiple claims, and not in the case of an
insurer failing to settle with a single claimant, which is settled Kentucky law.'s
Like the Massachusetts Court of Appeals in Scott, this greater discretion is
deference to the insurer's business judgment."s This deference is best effectuated
by adapting Kentucky's bad faith factors in single claimant situations and various
other states' factors for determining bad faith in multiple claimant situations into a
step-by-step analysis. This step-by-step analysis would place the burden on the
insured or claimant to show that the insured failed to meet the standard required
for each step the insurer took when it settled with certain claimants to the exclusion
of others.
The logical starting point for this analysis, demonstrated by the cases Ritz
examined, is the insured's investigation of potential claims arising out of a
potentially covered occurrence."' This standard, however, should be limited to a
reasonable investigation by the insurer in multiple claims situations. To require a
full investigation suggests that if the insurer were to reasonably investigate, yet for
some valid reason overlook a claim where liability is reasonably clear, the insurer
would have acted in bad faith.
' See Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glass, 996 S.W.2d 437, 451-53 (Ky. 1997).
o See Scott v. Gallacher, No. 10-P-209, 2011 WL 93084, *2 (Mass. App. Ct., Jan. 11, 2011).
161 See supra Section II.B.
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Furthermore, a reasonableness standard increases the burden of timely filing a
claim on the potential claimant, instead of completely relying on the insurer to
contact them. This would also have the effect of not requiring an insurer to extend
settlement negotiations to a potential claimant who, otherwise, had no intention of
filing a claim. This would, in turn, also limit the insured's exposure by not bringing
in potential claimants who did not seek insurance proceeds, thus protecting the
insured from an excess judgment.
After a reasonable investigation, the next logical step is to analyze whether the
potential claims would lead a reasonable insurer to believe that the aggregate of
potential claims would exceed the insured's policy limits. If an insurer reasonably
believes that the aggregate of the potential claims would not exceed the policy
limits, then the issue of multiple claims and limited finds simply does not exist. If
the insurer does reasonably find that the aggregate claims will exceed the policy
limits, the next step is to ascertain whether the insurer made reasonable attempts to
communicate to both the insured and potential claimants that there exist multiple
claims and limited funds. Within this step, the insurer must also give potential
claimants a reasonable time to respond before entering into settlement negotiations
with those parties that had in fact filed claims. This would further incentivize
potential claimants to act timely in filing a claim after being notified of the
situation, thus promoting prompt settlements. This would also incentivize the
various claimants to seek a global settlement with regard to the limited finds
available due to their knowledge that limited funds exist. Additionally, this global
settlement would allow the insurer to obtain releases of liability for the insured,
thus protecting the insured from an excess judgment.
Under this analysis, if an insurer has sufficiently met the requirements at each
stage, yet does not receive cooperation from potential claimants, the insurer has the
discretion to settle with the claimants that have timely filed and cooperated in
settlement discussions without fear of uncooperative claimants filing a bad faith
action against the insurer.
Furthermore, the problem with regard to whether an insurer continues to owe a
duty to defend its insured against a claim after exhausting the policy limits must be
addressed. As explained earlier, Kentucky courts' past rulings suggest that an
insurer could be obligated to defend an insured after the insurer has paid out the
policy limits regardless of the terms of the policy.162 This is contrary, however, to
both the majority rule and the plain words of the policy.' As such, Kentucky
courts should align themselves with the majority in applying a bright-line rule that
first looks to whether the policy speaks to whether the duty to defend continues in
such situations. If the policy does, then the policy governs. If, however, the policy
does not speak to the duty to defend in such situations, the policy should be
162 See supra Section I.A.
163 See supra Section IA.
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construed in favor of the insured thus extending the insurer's duty to defend the
insured in against any remaining or subsequent claims.
CONCLUSION
The situation of multiple claims and limited funds has wide reaching
implications for the insured, insurer, and potential claimants. Under the current
state of Kentucky law, these parties are without sufficient guidance for navigating
such a situation. As such, Kentucky courts must resolve this matter. Most
importantly, the solution must seek to clarify the implicated parties' rights and
obligations. This clarification should promote prompt settlements that protect an
insured from an excess judgment, while also providing sufficient guidance to
insurers in determining best practices. Firmly establishing Kentucky as a first to
settle state is the first step in this process. Next, Kentucky courts should adopt a
step-by-step analysis that would facilitate prompt settlements and protect insureds
from excess judgments. Adopting steps that grant insurer's increased discretion in
multiple claimant situations would further this purpose. Specifically, the steps of:
(1) did the insurer perform a reasonable investigation of potential claims; (2) would
this reasonable investigation lead a reasonable insurer to believe that the claims
exceeded the policy's limits; and (3) did the insurer communicate this situation to
both the insured and potential claimants, would grant clarity on this issue while
also protecting each party's interests.
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Harvard University
RICHARD C. AUSNESS, Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor
of Law. BA 1966, JD 1968, University of Florida; LLM 1973, Yale University
SCOTT BAURIES, Robert G. Lawson Associate Professor of Law. BA 1995, University of West
Florida; MEd 2001, University of South Florida; JD 2005, PhD 2008, University of Florida
JENNIFER BIRD-POLAN, James and Mary Lassiter Associate Professor of Law. BA 1999, Penn
State University-, JD 2007, Harvard University-, M.A. 2012, Vanderbilt University
CHRISTOPHER G. BRADLEY, Assistant Professor of Law. AB 2001, Princeton University-, MPhil
2003, University of Oxford; JD 2007, New York University School of Law-, LLM 2008, New
York University School of Law-, DPhil 2008, University of Oxford
TINA BROOKS, Electronic Services Librarian. BA 2005, University of Northern Iowa; JD 2009,
University of Nebraska College of Law-, MS 2011, University of Texas
ZACHARY A. BRAY, H. Wendell Cherry Associate Professor of Law, BA 2001, University of Notre
Dame; JD 2005, Yale Law School
RUTHEFORD B. CAMPBELL, JR., Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law. BA 1966, Centre College; JD
1969, University of Kentucky, LLM 1971, Harvard University
MARIANNA JACKSON CLAY, Visiting Professor of Law. B.A. 1975; JD 1978, University of
Kentucky
ALLISON CONNELLY, Director of the UK Legal Clinic and James and Mary Lassiter Professor of
Law. BA 1980, JD 1983, University of Kentucky
MARYJ. DAVIS, Stites & Harbison Professor of Law. BA 1979, University of Virginia; JD 1985,
Wake Forest University
JAMES M. DONOVAN, Law Library Director and James and Mary Lassiter Associate Professor of
Law. BA 1981, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga; MLIS 1989, Louisiana State
University-, PhD 1994, Tulane University-, MA 2000, Louisiana State University; JD 2003,
Loyola New Orleans School of Law
JOSHUA A. DOUGLAS, Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune Associate Professor of Law. BA
2002; JD 2007, George Washington University
CHRISTOPHER W. FROST, Thomas P. Lewis Professor of Law. BBA 1983; JD 1986, University of
Kentucky
BRYAN L. FRYE, Assistant Professor of Law. B.A. 1995, University of California, Berkeley,
M.F.A. 1997, San Francisco Art Institute; JD 2005, New York University
EUGENE R. GAETKE, Edward T. Breathitt Professor of Law. BA 1971; JD 1974 , University of
Minnesota
MARY LOUISE EVERETF GRAHAM, Senator Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law. BA 1965, JD
1977, University of Texas
JANE GRISE, Director of Academic Success and Professor of Legal Writing. BA; JD 1973,
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
ROBERTA M. HARDING, Professor of Law. BS 1981, University of San Francisco; JD 1986,
Harvard University
KRISTIN J. HAZELWOOD, Assistant Professor of Legal Research and Writing. BA 1996, University
of Louisville; JD 1999, Washington and Lee University
MICHAEL P. HEALY, Senator Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law. BA 1978, Williams College; JD
1984, University of Pennsylvania
MARK F. KIGHTLINGER, Edward T. Breathitt Associate Professor of Law. BA 1981, Williams
College; JD 1988, Yale Law School
AMELIA LANDENBERGER, Outreach Librarian. BA 2010, Case Western Reserve University, JD
2013, The Ohio State University, MLIS 2014, Kent State University
CORTNEY E. LOLLAR, Assistant Professor of Law. BA 1997, Brown University, JD 2002 New
York Univerisity
LESLIE M. MACRAE, Visiting Professor of Law. JD 1973, Baylor Law School; LLM 1977,
University of Miami School of Law, LLM 1983, Temple University Beasley School of Law
DOUGLAS MICHAEL, Stites & Harbison Professor of Law. AB 1979, Stanford University, MBA
1982, JD 1983, University of California
KATHYRN L. MOORE, Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law. AB 1983,
University of Michigan; JD 1988, Cornell University
MICHAEL D. MURRAY, Visiting Professor of Legal Research and Writing. Grad. Cert. 1986,
Fudan University, Shanghai, China; BA 1987, Loyola University Maryland; JD 1990,
Columbia University Law School
KAREN A. NUCKOLLS, Head of Technical Services. MSLS 1974, Wayne State University, MA
1985, Eastern Michigan University.
MELYNDAJ. PRICE, Robert E. Harding, Jr. Professor of Law. BS 1995, Prairie View A & M
University, JD 2002, University of Texas; PhD 2006, University of Michigan
FRANKLIN L. RUNGE, Faculty Services Librarian. BA 2000, Hiram College; JD 2003,
Northeastern University of Law, MLS 2010, Indiana University
PAUL E. SALAMANCA, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs Professor of Law. AB 1983, Dartmouth College;
JD 1989, Boston College
ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law and William L.
Matthews, Jr. Professor of Law. BA 1967, Amherst College; JD 1970, Harvard University
BEAU STEENKEN, Instructional Services Librarian. BA 2000, University of Texas at Austin; JD
2003, University of Texas School of Law-, LLM 2003, University of Nottingham, United
Kingdom; MS 2008, Texas State University-San Marcos; MSIS 2010, University of Texas
School of Information
RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD, William L. Matthews, Jr. Professor of Law. BA 1969; JD 1976, The
Ohio State University
HAROLD R. WEINBERG, Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of Law. AB 1966; JD 1969, Case
Western Reserve University, LLM 1975, University of Illinois
SARAH N. WELLING, Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law and Laramie L.
Leatherman Professor of Law. BA 1974, University of Wisconsin; JD 1978, University of Kentucky
ANDREW K. WOODS, Assistant Professor of Law. AB 2002, Brown University, JD 2007, Harvard
University, PhD 2012, University of Cambridge
ADJUNCT FACULTY
GLEN S. BAGBY, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1966, Transylvania University-, JD 1969,
University of Kentucky. Firm: Dinsmore & Shohli
FRANK T. BECKER, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1979, University of Kentucky. Equine and
Commercial Law and Litigaiton Practitioner
DON P. CETRULO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1971, Morehead State University, JD 1974,
University of Kentucky. Firm: Knox & Cetrulo
JENNIFER COFFMAN, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1969, JD 1978, University of Kentucky.
Retired ChiefJudge of the Eastern District of Kentucky
REBECCA DILORETO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1981, Amherst College; JD 1985, University
of Kentucky. Children's Law Center
ANDREW DORISIO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BS 1980, West Virginia University, JD 1996,
University of Kentucky. Firm: King & Schickli
CHARLES FASSLER, Adjunct Professor of Law. BS 1967, Brooklyn College; JD 1970, University of
Wisconsin Law School; LLM 1974, New York University School of Law
WILLIAM GARMER, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1975, University of Kentucky. Firm: Garmer &
Prather PLLC.
JANET GRAHAM, Adjunct Professor of Law. BS 1987, Virginia Tech University, JI) 1991,
University of Kentucky College of Law. Commissioner of Law, Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Government
KAREN GREENWELL, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1976, JD 1985, University of Kentucky.
Firm: Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs
PIERCE W. HAMBLIN, Adjunct Professor of Law. BBA 1973, JD 1977, University of Kentucky.
Firm: Landrum & Shouse
JAMES G. HARRALSON, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1979, University of Kentucky. Retired
Associate General Counsle for AT&T Mobility
JOHN HAYS, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1985, Princeton University, JD 1988, University of
Kentucky. Firm: Jackson Kelly
G. EDWARD HENRY II, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1976, JD 1979, University of Kentucky.
Firm: Henry, Watz, Raine &Marino
GAYLE W. HERNDON, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1982, University of Kentucky. Retired Tax
Counsel for Tax Policy and Planning at the General Electric Company
PAULA HOLBROOK, Adjunct Professor of Law. BS 1990, JD 1993, University of Kentucky. UK
HealthCare
GUlON JOHNSTONE, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 2005, Transylvania University, MSW 2011,
JD 2011, University of Louisville. Director of Maxwell Street Legal Clinic
EMILYJONES, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 2011, University of Kentucky. Immigration Attorney
at Kentucy Refugee Ministries
RAYMOND M. LARSON, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1970, University of Kentucky. Fayette
County Commonwealth Attorney
JOHN T. MCGARVEY, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1970,JD 1973, University of Kentucky. Firm:
Morgan &Pottinger
GEORGE MILLER, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1975, AM 1978, Brown University-, PhD 1981,
Brown University-, JD 1984, University of Kentucky. Firm: Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs
MARGARET PISACANO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BSN 1980, Vanderbilt; JD 1983, University of
Kentucky. Associate General Counsel and Director of Risk Management at University of
Kentucky's Chandler Medical Center
DAMON PRESTON, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1991, Transylvania University-, JD 1994,
Harvard. Deputy Public Advocate
STEVEN ROUSE, Adjunct Professor of Law. AB 1999, University of Illinois; JD 2006,
Northwestern University
THALETIA ROtrT, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 2000, University of Kentucky. Associate
General Counsel for University of Kentucky
THOMAS E. RUTLEDGE, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1985, St. Louis University, JD 1990,
University of Kentucky. Firm: Stoll Keenon Ogden
JOE SAVAGE, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1964, University of Kentucky
LINDA SMITH, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1997, Transylvania University-, JD 1994, Northern
Kentucky Salmon P. Chase College of Law
LARRY SYKES, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1975, Vanderbilt University-, JD 1983, University of
Kentucky. Firm: Stoll Keenon Ogden
WILLIAM THRO, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1986, Hanover College; MA 1988, University of
Melbourne (Australia); JD 1990, University of Virginia School of Law
M. LEE TURPIN, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1997, Transylvania University, JD 1992,
University of Kentucky College of Law. First Assistant County Attorney
ANDREA WELKER, Adjunct Professor of Law. BA 1997, Transylvania University, JD 2009,
University of Kentucky College of Law
CHARLES WISDOM, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1985, University of Louisville. Chief, Appellate
Section, US Attorney's Office
JEFFREY YOST, Adjunct Professor of Law. JD 1972, West Virginia University; LL.M. 1979
Georgetown University. Firm: Jackson Kelly PLLC
